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FEATURE COMMENT: Risky Business:
Managing Interagency Acquisition
Some celebrities live by the credo that any pub-
licity—positive or negative—is good publicity. In
procurement, the better motto is “no news is
good news.” Media interest in procurement typi-
cally results from bad judgments, errors, waste-
ful practices or scandals. Similarly, no one wants
to see their program headlining a Government
Accountability Office report. And, surely, a
bureaucrat’s worst nightmare is inclusion in
GAO’s High Risk Series.
But sometimes the spotlight helps. GAO re-
cently added the management of interagency con-
tracting to its high risk list. GAO-05-207, High
Risk Series: An Update (Jan. 2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05207.pdf; see
47 GC ¶ 58. Bravo for GAO! This FEATURE COM-
MENT articulates the concern that interagency ac-
quisition, the poster child for the flexible, stream-
lined, businesslike approach of the 1990’s
acquisition reform movement, has become our
procurement system’s Achilles heel.
At one level, GAO highlights what we already
knew. See, e.g., “Task and Delivery Order Con-
tracting: Congress Speaks, GAO Reports, and the
FAR Does a Fan Dance,” 14 N&CR ¶ 32; “Task
and Delivery Order Contracts: The Pot Is Boil-
ing,” 13 N&CR ¶ 18 (“The failure of the [Federal
Acquisition Regulation] to … provid[e] the agen-
cies useful guidance on the use of task and de-
livery order contracts has resulted in virtual an-
archy.”); “Task and Delivery Order Contracting:
Great Concept, Poor Implementation,” 12 N&CR
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¶ 30. In recent years, there’s been growing recogni-
tion of the problems and, fortunately, increased con-
gressional and executive branch damage-control ef-
forts. In its January 2005 high risk list update, GAO
concedes that much has been done:
In 2003, the Congress sought to improve contract
oversight and execution by enacting the Services
Acquisition Reform Act. The Act created a new
chief acquisition officer position … and enhanced
workforce training and recruitment. More re-
cently, the Congress responded to the misuse of
interagency contracting by requiring more inten-
sive oversight of purchases under these contracts.
In July 2004, [the General Services Administra-
tion] launched “Get It Right,” an oversight and
education program. ... Additionally, to address
workforce issues, [Office of Management and
Budget], GSA, and [Department of Defense] offi-
cials have said they are developing new skills as-
sessments, setting standards for the acquisition
workforce, and coordinating training programs
aimed at improving the capacity of the federal
acquisition workforce to properly handle the grow-
ing and more complex workload of service acqui-
sitions.
Nonetheless, GAO makes a compelling case for con-
cern:
If not properly managed, a number of factors can
make these interagency contract vehicles high risk
in certain circumstances: (1) they are attracting
rapid growth of taxpayer dollars; (2) they are be-
ing administered and used by some agencies that
have limited expertise with this contracting
method; and (3) they contribute to a much more
complex environment in which accountability has
not always been clearly established. Use of these
contracts, therefore, demands a higher degree of
business acumen and flexibility on the part of the
federal acquisition workforce than in the past. …
[T]he challenges associated with these contracts,
recent problems related to their management,
and the need to ensure that the government ef-
fectively implements measures to bolster over-
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sight and control so that it is well positioned
to realize the value of these contracts warrants
[attention].
Abu Ghraib: The Final Straw?—So, why did
“management of interagency contracting” make
GAO’s high risk list this time around? First, the
scope of the problem continues to grow as inter-
agency contract vehicle usage steadily increases.
GAO notes, “The General Services Administration
(GSA) alone … has seen a nearly tenfold increase
in interagency contract sales since 1992, pushing
the total sales mark up to $32 billion. Other agen-
cies, such as the Department of the Treasury and
the National Institutes of Health, also sponsor in-
teragency contracts.”
Moreover, despite prior GAO and IG reports and
warnings, nothing garners attention like a high-pro-
file scandal. The incendiary allegations of contrac-
tors participating in the Abu Ghraib prison abuses
apparently provided the straw that broke the camel’s
back. As GAO explained, “The inspector general for
the Department of the Interior found that task or-
ders for interrogators and other intelligence services
in Iraq were improperly awarded under a GSA sched-
ule contract for information technology services.” But
the out of scope work—a longstanding problem with
these vehicles—was the tip of the iceberg. The larger
concerns with the use of interagency contracting
were (1) the lack of post-award contract management
and (2) the pathologies associated with fee-based Gov-
ernment procurement. See, e.g., the Fay Report,
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/
fay82504rpt.pdf, at 47-52; and “Contractor Atrocities
at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a
Streamlined, Outsourced Government,” 16 Stan. L.
& Pol’y Rev. 549 (forthcoming 2005).
The Contract Management Crisis—While
much of the audit community’s energy has been ap-
plied to chronicling the lack of competition during the
award of interagency contracts, less attention has
been focused upon the troubling vacuum surround-
ing the post-award management of task orders. On
the one hand, it seems reasonable to suggest that the
servicing agency, in return for the fee it receives,
should bear responsibility for managing the work.
Conversely, the purchasing agency seems better po-
sitioned to supervise the work. Unfortunately, anec-
dotal evidence suggests that the diffusion of respon-
sibility often results in neither agency properly
managing the task orders. For example, the Fay in-
vestigation found that the officer in charge of inter-
rogations received no parameters or guidance for use
of contractor personnel, was unfamiliar with the
contract’s terms and procedures, made no mention
of a Government Contracting Officer’s representative,
and understood her primary point of contact to be the
contractor’s on-site manager. This sub-optimal situa-
tion is exacerbated because neither the purchasing
nor the servicing agency enjoys sufficient personnel
to manage their contractors’ efforts.
No issue threatens the integrity—perceived and
actual—of our procurement system more than the
(current and prospective) inadequacy of the
Government’s contract management resources. GAO
recently found insufficient post-award contract man-
agement on more than a quarter of the DOD con-
tracts it reviewed. GAO-05-274, Contract Management:
Opportunities to Improve Surveillance on Department
of Defense Service Contracts (March 2005); see 47 GC
¶ 161, this issue. It’s disheartening to read DOD’s per-
ception that “insufficient surveillance occurred be-
cause surveillance is not as important to contracting
officials as awarding contracts. ...” Nor is it encour-
aging that “surveillance was usually a part-time re-
sponsibility and some personnel felt that they did not
have enough time in a normal workday to perform
their surveillance duties.”
Accordingly, it’s easy to agree with Steve
Kelman’s conclusion “that ‘contract administration
was largely a stepchild of procurement reform’ in
the 1990s and … [needs] attention in the future.”
“Acquisition Reform, A Progress Report,” 16 N&CR
¶ 48. And maybe most right-thinking minds now
appreciate the fundamental risk of governing amid
an aggressive outsourcing (OK, competitive sourc-
ing) regime that woefully lacks appropriate acqui-
sition resources. But don’t bet on it. Investing in
acquisition workforce remains a tough sell on both
the Hill and on Pennsylvania Avenue.
Reliance on interagency contracting makes sense
in such an environment. GAO explains, “These types
of contracts have allowed customer agencies to meet
the demands for goods and services at a time when
they face growing workloads, declines in the acquisi-
tion workforce, and the need for new skill sets.” Simi-
larly, we must question whether agencies will be will-
ing (or able) to wean themselves from these practices.
The Fee as Incentive—The other concern high-
lighted by the Abu Ghraib experience—skewed incen-
tives that derive from fee-based purchasing vehicles—
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is less well documented. GAO explains that a “fee-for-
service arrangement creates an incentive to increase
sales volume in order to support other programs of
the agency that awards and administers an inter-
agency contract. This may lead to an inordinate fo-
cus on meeting customer demands at the expense of
complying with required ordering procedures.”
These observations mirror the Interior
Department’s findings. After finding that eleven of
the twelve procurements it reviewed fell outside the
scope of the GSA schedules used, the Interior De-
partment IG focused on the role played by inter-
agency contracting fees. The IG concluded that the
pursuit of fees distorted the moral compass that we
expect to animate Federal Government procurement
officials. Specifically, the IG highlighted “[t]he inher-
ent conflict in a fee-for-service operation, where pro-
curement personnel in the eagerness to enhance or-
ganization revenues have found shortcuts to Federal
procurement procedures and procured services for
clients whose own agencies might not do so.” Memo-
randum from Earl Devaney, inspector general, De-
partment of the Interior, to assistant secretary for
policy, management and budget (July 16, 2004), at
http://www.oig.doi.gov. A similarly critical assess-
ment recently came from the GSA IG’s review of the
Federal Technology Service (FTS).
Our procurement regime assumes a model in
which agencies rely upon warranted purchasing pro-
fessionals to procure their needed supplies and ser-
vices. See, e.g., FAR subpt. 1.6. This longstanding
arrangement bifurcates programmatic authority
from procurement authority. We assume that COs
will be familiar with, understand and follow con-
gressional mandates and effectuate the Govern-
ment’s procurement policies in making these pur-
chases. COs are expected to meet the program
manager’s needs, but only within the established
constraints of the procurement system.
Unfortunately, the incentives associated with
interagency fee-based vehicles alter this dynamic.
Fee-based purchasing offices (or, in other words, the
servicing agency) need revenue to survive. Thus,
the pursuit of fees, rather than any congression-
ally mandated mission, drives these purchasing or-
ganizations. The Abu Ghraib experience offers a
startling illustration. Lay observers struggle to
grasp why the military relied upon the Department
of the Interior’s National Business Center (NBC)
to procure the services of contractor personnel to
conduct interrogations in Iraq and Guantanamo
Bay. Yet NBC’s Web site, www.nbc.gov, touts a di-
verse customer base including (1) the Public De-
fender Service of the District of Columbia; (2) the
Millennium Challenge Corporation, which provides
foreign development assistance to countries that
adopt pro-growth strategies for meeting political,
social and economic challenges; and (3) the African
Development Foundation, which provides grants
directly to private organizations in Africa to carry
out sustainable self-help development activities. Go
figure. Like a commercial firm, to the extent that
“[t]he NBC operates on a full cost-recovery business
basis[,]” it ultimately exists to generate fees. See
NBC, “Overview,” at www.nbc.gov/overview.html.
That may constitute businesslike Government, but
it’s a strange mandate for a Government instru-
mentality.
Businesslike Government?—The private sec-
tor offers numerous lessons that can increase Gov-
ernment performance. Fees, no doubt, offer a use-
ful incentive structure. But there are limits. Unlike
most COs, buyers in organizations dependent upon
fees must balance their duty to serve the public with
their need to generate income. For example, read-
ers of THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR may recall that
the Government Printing Office (GPO) previously
threatened to bar federal purchasing offices from
publishing solicitation notices in the Commerce
Business Daily (CBD, since replaced by FedBizOpps).
GPO, no doubt, was frustrated that those agencies
had failed to pay their printing fees and badly
wanted those “deadbeat” agencies to fulfill their
commitments.
But GPO lost sight of the big picture. The CBD
was “the public notification media by which U.S. Gov-
ernment agencies identify proposed contract actions
and contract awards.” FAR 5.101. Both the Small
Business Act, 15 USCA § 637(e), and the OFPP Act,
41 USCA § 416, required agencies to publish notices
in the CBD. An outstanding debt to GPO was never
an exception to the publication requirement; nor did
such a debt excuse failure to comply with the publi-
cation and response times mandated in FAR 5.203.
See Steven L. Schooner, “The Future of ‘Business-
like’ Government: The CBD Asserts Its Rights
Against Debtor Federal Agencies,” 41 GC ¶ 112; and
Andrew M. Sherman, “GPO Answers Critics: Com-
merce Department Policy to Suspend Publication of
Solicitation Notices for Debtor Agencies Furthers
The Government Contractor ®
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Procurement Process Objectives,” 41 GC ¶ 167. Re-
member, businesses may “serve” the public, but only
to the extent that they serve their owners. Govern-
ment serves the public, not the Government. See
also the (admittedly lengthy) article, “Fear of Over-
sight: the Fundamental Failure of Businesslike Gov-
ernment,” 50 Am. U. L. Rev. 627 (2001); “Oversight
of Procurements: Is It Adequate?,” 15 N&CR ¶ 64;
and “Oversight of Procurements: Delayed Adden-
dum,” 16 N&CR ¶ 1.
Similarly, buying agencies have strong incen-
tives to fuel the fee-based enterprises. Program
managers at the purchasing (or receiving) agency
willingly pay a franchise fee (or a “premium”) to the
servicing agency to avoid the bureaucratic con-
straints (such as competition mandates) that slow
down in-house COs. In turn, the servicing agency
gladly streamlines the purchase. Finally, as dis-
cussed above, fee-based purchasing instrumentali-
ties have little stake in the outcome of contracts
that they award. Once the contract is awarded, the
servicing agency lacks both the interest and the re-
sources to manage the contract. Here, Ralph Nash
aptly noted that, “[i]n the traditional tug-of-war be-
tween ‘customer satisfaction’ ... and obtaining com-
petition, customer satisfaction [is] winning by a
large margin.” “Competition for Task Orders: The
Exception or the Rule?,” 18 N&CR ¶ 42.
It seems reasonable to ask whether introduc-
ing the interagency fee structure accelerates the
potential for a “race to the bottom.” For example,
while the Economy Act was not intended to permit
offloading of work or funds, as the end of the fiscal
year approaches, agencies frequently “park” or
“dump” funds by issuing open-ended or vague or-
ders that neither state a specific and definite re-
quirement nor identify a bona fide need.
Who’s Responsible?—But what should be
done? Although past experience may argue to the
contrary, there’s nothing inherently wrong with in-
teragency contracting. The problem lies in imple-
mentation. See, e.g., “Acquisition Reform, A
Progress Report,” 16 N&CR ¶ 48. GAO reports that
one of the difficulties of injecting accountability into
the process is that “[e]nsuring the proper use of in-
teragency contracts must be viewed as a shared re-
sponsibility of all parties involved.” Until now, this
diffusion of responsibility created an oversight and
management vacuum. Someone needs to take
charge.
OFPP Administrator David Safavian needs to
make good on his confirmation pledge to restore
and reinvigorate the acquisition workforce. Here,
actions will speak louder than words, and time will
tell whether he wields sufficient power to achieve
anything more than cosmetic improvements. The
Government needs more (1) experienced, creative
and thoughtful professionals to proactively enter
into results-oriented contractual agreements and
(2) qualified business people to manage effectively
the performance of the contractors until their
work is completed. Procurement, particularly the
management of service contracts, is a “high-level
job not, as presently conceived, a ministerial task.”
“Result-Oriented Contracting: Changing Our
Thinking,” 14 N&CR ¶ 8; and “Result-Oriented
Contracting: Delayed Addendum,” 14 N&CR ¶ 13.
Simply adding more auditors won’t solve the prob-
lem.
Next, to minimize the chaos, someone, prefer-
ably OFPP (or, in the alternative, GSA), must as-
sert supervisory control over, and potentially con-
solidate, the various interagency purchasing
organizations. Our decentralized procurement sys-
tem empowers agencies to procure to meet their
needs. And it makes sense to permit agencies to
procure needed commodities through agencies—
such as GSA or the Defense Logistics Agency—that
purchase those commodities in greater quantities.
But interagency purchasing premised upon neither
of these rationales leads to the current disaggre-
gated morass based upon entrepreneurial opportun-
ism.
Finally, it’s also time to have a meaningful con-
versation about the appropriate role of businesslike
models, generally, and fees, specifically, in gover-
nance. Is it true that agency eagerness to enhance
organization revenues might breed undesirable pur-
chasing behavior? Can the Government emulate
private-sector incentive structures? On the one
hand, momentum is building to increase incentive-
and performance-based compensation throughout
the civil service. On the other, Congress previously
capitulated to adverse public reaction to an Inter-
nal Revenue Service, incentivized to maximize re-
coveries from taxpayers, by creating a kinder, gen-
tler (and, empirically, less effective) IRS. In many
U.S. municipalities, furious debate surrounds traf-
fic light cameras, particularly where increased rev-
enues lead to increased profits.
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Barring a draconian solution, such as severely
limiting usage of interagency vehicles, we can’t ex-
pect prompt, dramatic improvement. GAO is right
that “effectively addressing interagency contract
management challenges will require agency man-
agement to commit the necessary time, attention,
and resources, as well as enhanced executive
branch and congressional oversight.” In the current
environment, that’s a tall order.

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